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WHEN AND HOW U.S. COURTS SHOULD
CITE FOREIGN LAW
Stephen Yeazel!*
At a recent Ohio State University symposium honoring her
fifteen years on the U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Ruth Bader
1
Ginsburg responded to questions submitted by law students.
One question asked her about the controversy surrounding
courts' citation of foreign law. Justice Ginsburg took a calm view
of the matter: "I frankly don't understand all the brouhaha lately
from Congress and even from some of my colleagues about
referring to foreign law." To demonstrate her point she offered
an example:
And one of the examples that I give of that was a case before
the Israeli Supreme Court some years ago: it was called The
Ticking Bomb Case. The police think that a suspect they have
apprehended knows where and when a bomb is going to go
off. Can the police use torture to extract that information?
And in an eloquent decision Aharon Barak then the Chief
Justice of Israel said. "Torture? Never!'' and explains that
''We could hand our enemy no greater weapon than to come
to look like that enemy in our disregard for human dignity."
Now why should I not read that opinion and be affected by its
tremendous persuasive value? So that's just one example.c

She followed her example with a comparison:
Our neighbor to the north, Canada ... is a very interesting
supreme court. probably cited more widely abroad than the
U.S. Supreme Court, I think for one reason: You will not be
listened to if you don't listen to others. I've been asked so
* David G. Price & Dallas P. Price Professor of Law. UCLA School of Law. I"m
grateful to Kenneth Karst. Jonathan Varat. and Eugene Volokh for comments on earlier
drafts and Dan Solish for timelv and excellent research assistance.
1. A streaming video of Justice Ginsburg·s remarks is available on line at http://www.cspanarchives.org/library /index.php ?main_page=product_ video _info& products_id=28521
4-1. Quotations from her comments below will come from a transcript of this streaming
video prepared by the author. which. as they pertain to foreign law. appear as an
appendix to this essay.
2. Infra app. 13-14.
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many times by jurists abroad: '"We in our country are inspired
by model of the U.S. Supreme Court. and we refer to your
decisions. but YS~U never refer to ours. Don't we have anything
to contribute?"'

Others disagree about the usefulness of foreign law.
According to the same New York Times article that reported
Justice Ginsburg's comments, Chief Justice Roberts responded
to a similar question during his nomination hearings by saying,
"If we're relying on a decision from a German judge about what
our Constitution means, no president accountable to the people
appointed that judge and no Senate accountable to the people
confirmed that judge."~ Some members of Congress have been
less measured: according to the Congressional Record, Senator
Cornyn (R-TX) has expressed concern
[O]ver a trend that some legal scholars and observers say may
be developing in our courts-a trend regarding the potential
influence of foreign governments and foreign courts in the
application and enforcement of U.S. law. If this trend is real,
then I fear that, bit by bit, case by case, the American people
may be slowly losing control over the meaning of our laws and
of our Constitution. If this trend continues, foreign
governments may even begin to dictate what our laws and our
Co9stitution mean, and what our policies in America should
be.'

And in the popular sphere, the rhetoric is even more heated;
apparently responding to Justice Ginsburg's Israeli example, a
television commentator noted:
WelL here's an idea for Justice Ginsburg. Perhaps she would
like to meet and talk with Saudi Judge Sheikh Kabib al
Habib, who has again denied to annul [sic] a marriage
between a 48-year-old man and an eight-year-old girl. Justice,
I think you should really talk to Judge al-Habib. By the way,
the child's father arranged that marriage in order to settle
debts, an interesting custom. Perhaps Justice Ginsburg would
with like us to bring that custom to the United States."

Justice Ginsburg is right on one big point: there is a lot
more heat than light in this small controversy: U.S. courts not
only do but often must cite foreign law in circumstances that
3. /d. app. 13-14.
4. Adam Liptak. Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on Her
Court, and Vice Versa. N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 12.2009. at A14.
5. 151 Co~G. REC. 53124-02 (2005).
6. Lou Dobbs Tonighr (CNN television broadcast Apr. 13. 2009).
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produce no comment-much less a brouhaha. Unfortunately.
both the example Justice Ginsburg gave and the motivation she
suggested in these two passages are unrepresentative and
misleading. In the overwhelming majority of cases where U.S.
courts cite foreign legal sources, they do so because such sources
are the only relevant authorities. Moreover. when U.S. courts do
cite foreign law, they are not doing so because they hope for
reciprocal respect from foreign tribunals: they're doing so
because they have to. Finally, almost none of these foreign
citations involve such controversial decisions as the use of
torture. Conversations with educated non-lawyers (and even an
occasional legal academic) suggest that misconceptions about
this ancient practice are reasonably widespread. So I've
imagined what Justice Ginsburg might have said-if she'd not
been responding off the cuff to a single question in a series, and
if she'd had a half hour instead of a minute and a half.
There is a debate about U.S. courts citing foreign legal
sources. A very small part of this debate is entirely legitimateand I'll return to that. But first, let's be clear that there are many
circumstances-accounting for the overwhelming majority of
citations to foreign law-when a judge, sworn to uphold the
Constitution, would be in dereliction of duty if he or she did not
cite foreign legal sources.
Start with the easiest cases. In recent decades the Supreme
Court, often in opinions written by Justices associated with a
conservative wing of the Court, has vindicated parties·
contractual power to manipulate the procedural rules under
7
which their cases are decided. One such manipulation- found in
large numbers of international contracts-is a choice of law
clause, in which the parties stipulate that the law of Britain. or
Mexico, or Italy will apply to any disputes arising under the
agreement. U.S. courts regularly hear and decide such casesapplying the law of the nation designated in the clause.' As you
read these words, there are half a dozen U.S. courts that are
assiduously citing foreign law, at the command of the U.S.
Supreme Court or of similar mandates from their state supreme
courts. They are doing so because the litigants have a choice of
7. See, e.g.. MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co .. 407 U.S. I (1972) (insisting on
the enforcement of a choice of forum clause that deprived U.S. courts of jurisdiction~and
relocating the litigation in Great Britain).
8. E.g.. Milanovich v. Costa Crociere. S.p.A.. 954 F.2d 7o3 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(applying Italian law in accordance with choice of law clause contained in 13-page cruise
ticket booklet).
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law clause and governing U.S. law says to respect that choice,
and to respect it, the courts have to cite and discuss foreign law.
That's not always easy or well done, a point to which I'll return,
but it is a duty of a court under existing U.S. law.
A closely related second category comprises those cases
where there's no choice of law clause but an ancient if
sometimes indeterminate body of law (called "conflict of laws") 9
dictates that the correct law to apply is foreign. So if on a trip to
Austria to attend some opera (answering a different question at
the symposium, Justice Ginsburg briefly discussed her favorite
operas), she were injured in an auto accident involving her
fellow Justice and opera buff, Antonin Scalia, and if, back in
Washington D.C., she brought suit against Justice Scalia to
recover for her injuries, it's likely that a court would conclude
that Austrian tort law applied to the case. 10 And again, the U.S.
court would be duty bound to cite and discuss Austrian statutes,
treatises, and the like. Such a practice would be entirely
uncontroversial; there is even a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
laying out the path by which litigants raise such issues of foreign
law.n
A third kind of case- still in the uncontroversial categoryarises when either a treaty or a statute explicitly refers to foreign
law. One such statute-the Alien Tort Act-famously but
mysteriously gives federal courts jurisdiction "of any civil action
by an alien, for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations." 12 Interpreting this statute has been difficult for the
courts, but almost everyone 13 who has looked at it has thought
that to apply the statute a U.S. jud~e has to decide what acts do
4
in fact violate "the law of nations." That phrase has been taken
to refer not to the law of a single nation, but to the consensus
reached by every (or almost every) nation even in the absence of
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS: INTERSTATE AND
l'iTERNATIONAL CO~FLICT OF LAWS § 10 (1971). For an overview of the conflict of
laws. see also LEA BRJLMAYER. CONFLICT OF LAWS (1995): FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER.
CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATEJUSTICE (2005).
10. E.g.. Pancotto v. Sociedade de Safaris de Mozam .. S.A.R.L.. 422 F. Supp. 405
(N.D. Ill. 1976) (applying Mozambique law to claim for personal injuries negligently
inflicted during safari).
11. FED. R. Clv. P. 44.
12. 28 u.s.c. § 1350 (2006).
13. Justice Ginsburg's friend and occasional opera companion Justice Scalia is an
exception here. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. 542 U.S. 692. 739 (2004) (Scalia. J.
concurring) (relying on precedent that eliminated the "general federal common law" on
which the Alien Tort Act rested (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64 (1938))).
14. 542 U.S. at 714-15.
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a treaty. 1' Two of the agreed-on examples include taking a
diplomat hostage and acts of piracy on the high seas: both violate
"the law of nations." But, almost everyone agrees, the only way
to give content to that phrase is to survey the law of nations to
establish whether there is a consensus and, if so, whether it
includes the act on which the plaintiff is basing her suit. Not too
long ago the U.S. Supreme Court found that it did not violate the
law of nations for U.S. Drug Enforcement agents to kidnap from
Mexico, and return to the U.S. for triaL a physician accused of
16
conspiring with drug lords to torture a U.S. officer. A similar
7
reference appears in the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Ad , part
of which abrogates sovereign immunity for a nation that has
taken the property of a U.S. citizen "in violation of international
law. " 1H Again, to prevail against the expropriating defendant, the
plaintiff has to show not that the complained-of act would have
been a taking under U.S. law but that there is a broad
international consensus about the illegality of a taking under the
19
circumstances of the case. To reiterate the point: to do that, any
responsible court has to cite and discuss foreign law to
demonstrate such a consensus.
So far there's virtually no debate about the propriety of a
federal or state judge citing foreign law; that law indisputably
governs the case at hand, and courts all over the United States
recognize their duty to find out what it is and apply it. The state
of that law may be unclear, but judges are obliged to try to
discern it just as they would a similarly relevant part of domestic
law.

15. /d. at 725 ("We think courts should require any claim based on the present-day
law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world").
16. /d. at 738.
Whatever may be said for the broad principle Alvarez advances. in the present.
imperfect world. it expresses an aspiration that exceeds any binding customary
rule having the specificity we require. Creating a private cause of action to
further that aspiration would go beyond any residual common law discretion we
think it appropriate to exercise. It is enough to hold that a single illegal
detention of less than a dav. followed bv the transfer of custodv to lawful
authorities and a prompt ·arraignment.. violates no norm of· customary
international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedv.'
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2006): 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2006).
.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2006).
19. See, e.g.. Siderman De Blake v. Republic of Arg .. 965 F.2d 699. 711 (9th Cir.
1992) ("describ[ing] three requisites under international law for a valid taking." in course
of opinion finding the conditions had not been satisfied in the case at hand (quoting West
v. Multibanco Comermex. S.A.. 807 F.2d 820.831-32 (9th Cir. 1987))).
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Let's get closer to the area where there's a legitimate
disagreement. Even that disagreement is considerably narrower
than one might gather from the comments. When should a U.S.
court cite or look to foreign law in interpreting a U.S. statute or
the Constitution? Chief Justice Roberts, in his confirmationhearing statement, seems to reject it as a breach of doctrines of
political accountability.co His statement, which might seem
undebatable. may in fact be a bit broader than Chief Justice
Roberts really means, and may imply more than he actually said.
As even the deepest skeptics about citation of foreign law
recognize, the U.S. Constitution is full of references to foreign
law. so full that one cannot make sense out of many of its
provisions without foreign law. 21 As Justice Scalia has pithily
acknowledged, "[T)he reality is that I use foreign law more than
anyone on the Court. But it's all old English law.''cc Though no
one debates this proposition, we've become so used to one brand
of "foreign'' law that we think it's domestic; it's so common that
we call it "common law." Consider just Article I, section 9, which
in the course of a few sentences defines Congressional power
over "habeas corpus," ''bill[s) of attainder," and ''letters of
marque and reprisal." These references. all of which would have
been well understood at the time of ratification and which would
continue to be so understood today, all refer to foreign law. Not
only these but many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. with
its references to unreasonable searches, the right to jury trial at
common law. and more-all assume a deep background in
foreign law. The law in question, of course, is that of Great
Britain. with which the United States had fought a long war to
gain their independence. But when the new nation wanted to
establish its government. it often did so by describing familiar
laws and practices that the Founders wished either to preserve
(like right of trial by jury) or to reject (like bills of attainder).
Both sorts of law were indisputably foreign, but a U.S. court
faced with a bill of attainder claim (a bill heavily taxing bonuses
paid to executives at T ARP-aided firms was recently attacked on
20. See supra text accompanying note 4.
21. E.g.. Roper v. Simmons. 543 U.S. 551. 626 (2005) (Scalia. 1.. dissenting) (""It is of
course true that we share a common history with the United Kingdom. and that we often
consult English sources when asked to discern the meaning of a constitutional text
written against the backdrop of 18th-century English law and legal thought."").
22. Antonin Scalia. Kevnote Address at the American Enterprise Institute
Conference: Outsourcing o( American Law (Feb. 21. 2006) (video available at
http://www.aei.org/event/1256: unofficial transcript created by a Scalia fan blog.
Ninoville. is available at http://www.joink.com/homes.'users/ninoville/aei2-21-06.asp ).
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the floor of Congress as a bill of attainderf would be bound by
duty to examine the British practice of such bills. True, a House
of Lords decision from the eighteenth century would not be
dispositive, but it would surely be entirely appropriate, even
though "no president accountable to the people" appointed the
law lords. In the early nineteenth century there was a brief-lived
debate about the propriety of citing British decisions in U.S.
courts. 24 That argument had some features of our contemporary
debate. Those who opposed the use of common law precedents
pointed out that those decisions were a) of a foreign sovereign,
and b) even worse, of a recently rejected foreign despoe' and
therefore subverted everything for which the new nation stood.
These opponents lost because-as everyone quickly
discovered- it was hard to make sense out of domestic law
unless one took account of the foreign law in which it had, until
very recently, been embedded. As Lawrence Friedman put it,
"In hindsight, the common law ... was as little threatened as the
English language. " 26 And, again, such citation of "foreign"
decisions continues to be uncontroversial.
So what are the controversial cases? Even here, there may
be less than meets the eye. Suppose a court confronts a case in
which the question is the scope of the Commerce Clause or
whether a statute falls within the ambit of the Necessary &
Proper Clause of Article I. If the justices wrote an opinion
resting on German precedents interpreting analogous provisions
in the German Grundgesetz, people might rightly think they had
taken leave of their senses. Surely the only relevant body of
understandings are-depending on one's taste in constitutional
interpretation- the text of the Constitution, the Framers'
writings and similar contemporary debate, the two hundred
years of precedents from U.S. courts, and perhaps changes in
popular understandings of the Constitution. But even this
proposition might be subject to exceptions. The post-war
Japanese constitution was famously modeled on that of the
United States-even in places, some have argued, where it didn't
23. See Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn. AIG and Wall St. Confront Upsurge
of Populist Fury. N.Y. TIMES. Mar. 20.2009. at Al.
24. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN. A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 94 (1973) ( .. When
the [Revolutionary] war ended. debates over law continued. The king of England and his
government had been successfully overthrown. Should the king·s law also be overthrown .
. . . The first generation seriously argued the question ... ).
25. /d. (quoting an eighteenth century pamphleteer: .. Can the monarchical and
aristocratical institutions of England. be consistent with ... republican principles~ .. ).
26. !d. at 95.

66

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 26:59

fit the Japanese situation very well. 27 Suppose the question was a
case of first impression for a U.S. court but that-one thinks this
unlikely but surely possible-the Japanese Supreme Court had
heard and decided a very closely analogous question. 2s Yes, it's
true that no U.S. President appointed the Japanese judges and
no U.S. Senate confirmed them. And no one thinks that the
decision of the Japanese court would be dispositive. But would it
really be irresponsible for a U.S. judge, seeking to understand
the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, to seek counsel from a
court interpreting the same clause in a sister democracy? I think
not, though I also think that any such citation would have to be
deeply contextualized-a point discussed below.
Now to the very small area of legitimate debate. Before
exploring that small area, recall how many citations of foreign
law are quite unremarkable; that is important to bear in mind, if
only so we can discuss the debatable ones. In some recent cases,
one or another justice, interpreting a provision of the Bill of
Rights has cited to foreign practices. Which nations still execute
29
minors? Which condemn interrogation practices as "torture"?
The Israeli decision to which Justice Ginsburg referred falls into
this category. Some have condemned these practices as
illegitimate; I take Chief Justice Roberts to be saying something
like this. Certainly Justice Scalia has: "More fundamentally,
however, the basic premise of the Court's argument-that
American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world- ought to be rejected out of hand. " 30
27. See Percy R. Luney. Jr .. Foreword. 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1. 2 (1990)
(describing the contemporary Japanese constitution as '"a document imposed by the
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers ... that included rather alien concepts").
28. Article 13 of the Constitution of Japan provides that the people's "right to life.
liberty. and the pursuit of happiness shall ... be the supreme consideration in legislation
and in other governmental affairs." Kenpo. art. 13: see also Hoashi v. Japan. 12 Minshu
1969 (Sup. Ct.. Sep. 10. 1958). translated in JOHN M. MAKI. COURT AND CONSTITUTION:
SELECfED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS. 1948-60 121 (1964) (Tanaka. J. concurring)
("We enjoy countless rights and freedoms in our daily lives. These. however. are not
known by particular names. They constitute a part of general freedom or the right of the
pursuit of happiness"). Occasionally U.S. courts have faced contentions that "life. liberty.
and the pursuit of happiness" are constitutionally cognizable claims. See Edwards v.
United States. 249 F.R.D. 25. 28 n.l (D. Conn. 2008) (finding that litigants allegation that
the prohibition of prayer to God in public schools has led to destructive teaching violates
the Declaration of Independence fails to state a cognizable cause of action): Coffey v.
United States. 939 F. Supp. 185. 190 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that the '"Declaration of
Independence does not grant rights that may be pursued through the judicial system").
29. That was the issue at stake in Roper v. Simmons. in which Justice Scalia
dissented in part on the majority's reliance on foreign practices. Roper v. Simmons. 543
U.S. 551.622-28 (2005) (Scalia. 1.. dissenting).
30. !d. at 624.
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Maybe the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia are right, but a
lot depends on exactly what they mean. The "unusual" part of
"cruel and unusual" has an inescapably empirical content.
Something is unusual if it doesn't happen very much; if it
happens a lot. it's usual. What's the universe of reference in
which a court has to decide whether a punishment is "unusual?"
It might be the United States and only the United States; and it
wouldn't be illogical so to conclude. But the appropriate
constitutional reference might be broader. Suppose a state were
to establish a particular form of juvenile rehabilitation that was
pioneering)' in the United States, because the state in question
had adapted its model from that used in several European
countries. Let's further imagine that someone might think the
punishment was cruel-perhaps because it involved a mild form
of behavior modification.)" Would a U.S. judge-would Chief
Justice Roberts or Justice Scalia-feel bound to strike down the
new punishment because it was heretofore unknown in the
United States? Or would they feel that they could appropriately
cite to practices and law in the various nations that had
pioneered this new treatment modality? I don't know the answer
to that question. What I do know is that the U.S. legal system
regularly encounters cases in which a conscientious judge, never
suspected of "internationalist" leanings, would be obliged to
look to the content of foreign law and in some cases to treat it as
controlling. That's because U.S. law is simply chock full of
reference and allusions to foreign law, some of it very old, some
of it quite recent.
Often hidden m the sometimes fiery but often
unilluminating dialogue about foreign law is a difficult
problem-a problem that sounds less in national sovereignty and
American values than in judicial craft. Often the problem with
foreign law is not enough rather than too much. Justice Scalia
has captured this problem with a recycled quip about the Court
"look[ing] over the heads of the crowd [to] pick out its friends. ")3
31. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. 285 U.S. 262. 311 (1932) (Brandeis. J ..
dissenting) (""It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may. if its citizens choose. serve as a laboratory: and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."').
32. See Gillis v. Lischer. 468 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2006) (vacating summary judgment
against prisoner claiming behavior modification program violated the Eighth
Amendment).
33. Roper. 543 U.S. at 617 (Scalia. J .. dissenting). As Justice Scalia acknowledged.
he was borrowing the phrase from Judge Harold Leventhal. who described the selective
use of legislative history as ··the equivalent of entering a crowed cocktail party and
looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends'·. Conroy v. Aniskoff. 507 U.S. 511.
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Justice Scalia has a point, though the point has an implication he
might not favor-that the solution to "the foreign law problem"
will sometimes be not less but more such citations.
To illustrate the point consider two instances, one drawn
from Justice Ginsberg's example of the Israeli case, and one
from a Supreme Court decision, Roper v. Simmons,'4 concerning
the constitutionality of executing those whose capital crimes
were committed when they were less than 18 years old.
Take first Justice Ginsberg's example-the "ticking bomb"
case in which Chief Justice Barak rejects torture as a tactic
because, as Justice Ginsburg quotes him, "We could hand our
enemy no greater weapon than to come to look like that enemy
in our disregard for human dignity."" Justice Ginsburg is surely
right when she poses the rhetorical question, "Now why should I
not read that opinion and be affected by its tremendous
persuasive value?" But notice two things about this example.
First, it's entirely and transparently self-contained. The moral
force of Justice Barak's argument is captured entirely in a single,
pithy sentence. Moreover, little depends on the circumstance
that the sentence was part of a decision because its point is
universal- unmoored from any particular legal system. It is an
appeal to a general moral principle more than to the case
instantiating that principle. True, one might attach some extra
weight to the circumstance that Justice Barak persuaded his
judicial colleagues to sign on to the point, and perhaps even
more that it was uttered by a court in a society that has for
decades been beleaguered by enemies willing to resort to
extreme tactics. But, I suggest, the citation stands on its own as a
potentially persuasive argument- but no more persuasive than
would be the same statement made in a journal article. This

519 (1993).
34. Roper. 543 U.S. at 551.
35. The actual opinion is. one is sorry to say. less pithy:
[A] reasonable investigation is necessarily one free of torture. free of cruel.
inhuman treatment, and free of any degrading conduct whatsoever. There is a
prohibition on the use of 'brutal or inhuman means' in the course of an
investigation. Human dignity also includes the dignity of the suspect being
interrogated. This conclusion is in accord with international treaties. to which
Israel is a signatory. which prohibit the use of torture. 'cruel. inhuman
treatment' and 'degrading treatment.' These prohibitions are 'absolute.'
HCJ 5100/94. Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53 (4). translated in
TORTURE: A COLLECTION 165 (Sanford Levinson. ed .. 2004). Justice Landau made a
statement. cited by the Court. that comes closer to Justice Ginsberg's paraphrase: "The
interrogation practices of the police in a given regime are indicative of a regime's very
character." Id.
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argument happens to occur in a foreign case. but its
persuasiveness has nothing to do with its origins.
Contrast with this example the part of the majority opinion
in Roper v. Simmons in which Justice Kennedy reviews the
status of juvenile executions. I use Roper as an example because
I am sympathetic with the Court"s outcome; for me, only its
methodology is at stake. In Roper, Justice Kennedy's opinion for
the Court devotes five paragraphs to a treatment of foreign
systems' stances on the question at hand. Foreign law is relevant
to the disproportionality branch of the Eighth Amendment
analysis on which the case turns: "'Our determination that the
death penalty is disproportionate punishment for offenders
under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United
States is the only country in the world that continues to give
official sanction to the juvenile death penalty'".'" The opinion for
the majority demonstrates this contention by noting that all but
the United
two U.N. members states have ratified Article 37 of
7
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child;' that of the
seven countries other than the U.S. who had actually executed
juveniles since 1990. each had either abolished or abjured the
practice; and that the United Kingdom. on whose declaration of
rights the Eighth Amendment was based, had abolished juvenile
execution decades before it abolished the death penalty
altogether.'"
This is not enough of a good thing. Let us sidestep the
question of whether one should ever look to international law or
practice for the content of a U.S. constitutional norm.'" If one is
going to appeal to foreign law, the appeal has to be effective.
Effective use of foreign law requires that it be treated as
respectfully as state law-surveyed carefully and contextualized
rather than mentioned in passing references. Justice Kennedy
doesn't think he can mention in passing that many states have
abolished capital punishment for juveniles; instead he devotes
most of the opinion to this proposition, and for good measure
attaches an appendix with charts showing in several different
ways the changing fortunes of juvenile execution.

36. Roper. 543 U.S. at 575.
37. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37. Nov. 20. !989.
1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 28 I.LM. 1448. 1469-70.
3R Roper. 543 U.S. at 575.
39. Some might argue that no foreign source should ever be cited except when
required.
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Not so for the foreign references. As a result. the discussion
of foreign law is weaker than that of domestic law. As Justice
Scalia has suggested in another context, one should subtract
from the denominator in the UN Convention those nations that
have abolished capital punishment for all cases; it's politically
costless for such a nation to ratify Article 37, forbidding juvenile
executions, because the polity in question has already decided
40
not to execute anyone. Justice Scalia is likely also correct in
noting that a fuller consideration of this matter would note that
some nations maintain a mandatory death penalty for some
crimes; and that one might examine more closely the actual
practices of some nations that claim to have abolished the death
41
penalty for juveniles. None of these points is in principle
unanswerable. Moreover, none of them arises because the law
involved is foreign: the objections are those involving analysis
and craft, not any special feature of foreign law. But their
answers call for deeper, more nuanced exploration of foreign law
when a court thinks it relevant-as the majority does in Roperto the content of such multi-national norms as capital
punishment.
International law, if it is to be used, should be used wellnot as an ornament or afterthought. As a passing example that
carries its own persuasiveness-the Israeli torture example-a
single citation is fine. But if one wants to make claims about
international consensus, that requires more and better
exploration. In that exploration context matters. Moreover,
context matters just as much in the small, unremarkable uses of
foreign law as it does in the big, controversial ones.
To demonstrate the point, consider an unremarkable case.
one in which all would agree that foreign law governed. In 1973,
Rosemary Pancotto took an adventurous vacation-a hunting
safari in Mozambique, which then had just emerged from
Portuguese colonial rule. The trip turned out to be more

40. See Antonin Scalia. Keynote Address at the American Enterprise Institute
Conference: Outsourcing of American Law (Feb. 21. 2006)
In a 1988 case. Thompson v. Oklahoma. the court noted that ·other nations that
share our Anglo-American heritage. and by the leading members of the
Western European community' oppose the death penalty for a person less than
sixteen years old when the crime was committed. I must also interject that those
countries also opposed the death penalty when the person was more than
sixteen years old. but nevermind.
(citing Thompson v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 815 (1988)) (transcript available at
http://www.aei.orglevent/1256: emphasis added).
41. Roper. 543 U.S. at 623.
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adventurous than Ms. Pancotto had hoped, for she was injured
when a swamp buggy operated by a tour employee struck her.
Back in Illinois, she sued the Mozambican tour operator:' The
court hearing that case had to decide what law applied. It made
an odd determination: that Mozambican law might apply to the
question of liability, but that the Mozambican limitation on
damages (capping liability at US$6.600) did not apply.~' That
determination gave the plaintiff the advantage of what looked
like favorable standard for liability ("liability. . . imposed
without regard to fault"~) but an uncapped limit on damages.
Surely this is a failure to consider the context of foreign law.~' In
context, capped damages appear linked to a regime of liability
without fault. in the same way some workers' compensation
regimes operate.~" The same necessity for contextualization
applies to large constitutional questions. Earlier I hypothesized
that a U.S. court mi_pht justifiably cite a provision of the
Japanese constitution. If it did so, however. it might be
important to note that Japan has a parliamentary rather than a
presidential system- and that its constitutional wisdom about
separation of powers might accordingly be more limited than on
a feature shared by both systems.
Finally, the point is simple: "good" citation of foreign law
will have the same characteristics as good citation of domestic
law; they will be complete, carefuL and contextualized. Hit-andrun citations are bad whether they use foreign or domestic
sources. Thus stated, the point becomes commonplace. But
given the occasionally hysterical rhetoric surrounding discussion
of foreign law, lowering the volume of the discussion to the
commonplace may be a useful contribution.
Thus much of what I wish Judge Ginsburg might have
said-even at the risk of having her audience nod off. Now to
the thing I wish she hadn't said. Her statement that the Canadian
Supreme Court might be more widely cited than the U.S.
42. Pancotto v. Sociedade de Safaris de Mozam .. S.A.R.L.. 422 F. Supp. 405 (N.D.
Ill. 1976).
43. !d. The opinion does not reach a firm conclusion about whether Illinois or
Mozambican law would apply. asking for additional briefing on that question.
44. !d. at 408.
45. In fairness. the federal court was sitting in diversity jurisdiction and thus bound
to apply the conflicts principles it thought that Illinois was likely to apply. See Klaxon v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co .. 313 U.S. 487 (1941 ). It may well have been correct to predict that
Illinois would perform the same uncontextualized analvsis.
46. A point defendant had tried to make by s~bmitting an affidavit stating that
defendant had no liability insurance.
47. See supra text at note 28.
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Supreme Court may be accurate. But it unfortunately implies
that a judge's choosing to cite foreign law depends significantly
on a justice's views about how important foreign judicial
"respect" is. That's misleading because it's descriptively
inaccurate-wildly inaccurate. In the overwhelming majority of
instances a U.S. judge cites foreign law because she has to, not
because she's hoping for reciprocal international respect. And in
most of the instances in which she isn't compelled to, the judge
very likely has reasons that, again, have nothing to do with the
hope that foreign judges and lawyers will respect U.S.
jurisprudence. The judge does so because she or he believes that
foreign law has something valuable. perhaps necessary, to say
about the outcome of the case.
To return to my starting point: I'm making far too much out
of Justice Ginsburg's brief response to a single question she'd
not seen in advance. But the question dealt with an issue about
which I've had a number of conversations with intelligent. wellmeaning non-lawyers who are equally confused by statements
like that of Chief Justice Roberts and Senator Cornyn-implying
that citation of foreign law comes near to political subversionand that of Justice Ginsburg-suggesting that citation of foreign
law is a bid for international popularity. Neither Justice intended
to convey those meanings. But some of their public statements
might increase public misunderstandings, so one is sorry about
any missed chance to clarify.
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APPENDIX
Justice Ginsburg's complete comments on foreign law.
which appear on the streaming video starting at 54:58, as
transcribed by the author:
"Learning about another system opens your eyes to your
own system. and I appreciated the way our system works ever so
much more when I could see it in a comparative light. You also
learn to be more flexible ....
"I frankly don't understand all the brouhaha lately in
Congress and even from some of my colleagues about referring
to foreign law. John Marshall did it. There is perhaps a
misunderstanding that when you refer to. say, a decision of the
Law Lords, or of the Supreme of Israel. or of the Constitutional
Court of South Africa that you are using those as binding
precedent. Well of course they're not binding precedent: they're
not our law. But there are so many systems with whom we share
common values, and issues. similar issues come up. Why
shouldn't we look to the wisdom of a judge from abroad with at
least as much ease as we would read a law review article written
by a professor?
"And one of the examples that I give of that was a case
before the Israeli Supreme Court some years ago: it was called
The Ticking Bomb Case. The police think that a suspect they
have apprehended knows where and when a bomb is going to go
off. Can the police use torture to extract that information? And
in an eloquent decision Aharon Barak then the Chief Justice of
Israel said. 'Torture? Never!' and explains that ·we could hand
our enemy no greater weapon than to come to look like that
enemy in our disregard for human dignity.' Now why should I
not read that opinion and be affected by its tremendous
persuasive value? So that's just one example.
"Our neighbor to the north, Canada, wasn't in the business
of judicial review for constitutionality until 1982, when they got
their Charter of Rights and Freedoms. And now that is a very
interesting supreme court. probably cited more widely abroad
than the U.S. Supreme Court. I think for one reason: You will
not be listened to if you don't listen to others. I've been asked so
many times by jurists abroad: we in our country are inspired by
model of the U.S. Supreme Court. and we refer to your
decisions, but you never refer to ours. Don't we have anything to
contribute?
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·'for so many years the United States was the only country
engaged in judicial review for constitutionality. Most systems
had an idea like Mark's: that a court shouldn't mess with those
fundamental values but leave them to Parliament -the courts
should stay out of those things. We are the people's
representatives and we should decide those questions. What
happened in Europe was the Holocaust. and people came to see
that popularly elected representatives could not always be
trusted to preserve the system's most basic values. So many
countries decided that they would install a constitutional court as
one check against return to that kind of government. And so
there are now many courts in the world doing review for
constitutionality. And they are looking to each other, not for
binding authority, but to see how other good minds have dealt
with this problem.
"I think that this is a passing phase, that we will go back to
where we were in the early nineteenth century, when there was
no question that it was appropriate to refer to decisions of other
tribunals."

